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The Constitution and the
Consolidated Statutes
I. Introduction
Five years ago the Pennsylvania General Assembly adopted an
act whose purpose was to allow complete codification of the Com-
monwealth's statutory law. For many years Pennsylvania has been
the only American jurisdiction without a statutory code.' Pennsyl-
vania practitioners have had to deal with hundreds of different acts,
some dating as far back as 1700.2 Many of these acts are inconsis-
tent with or duplicative of others governing 'the same activity. Still
others are outdated and made useless by later enactments. To facili-
tate codification of this vast body of statutory law, the general assem-
bly enacted Act 230 of 19708 and designated its publication the
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes (PCS).4  Act 230 provides the
structural framework for the codification. Codified subject areas are
drafted as amendments to this Act. Although codification of Penn-
sylvania statutes is proceeding piecemeal, substantial progress has
been made in the short time since the enactment of Act 230. Three
complete titles and nine partial titles have become part of the PCS.5
1. Zeiter, The Consolidated Pennsylvania Statutes-Codification Comes to
Pennsylvania, 43 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 538 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Zeiter].
2. Act of November 27, 1700, 1 SM. L. 7, cb. 48, § 2 (compiled at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 782 (1953)).
3. Act of November 25, 1970, P.L. 707, No. 230.
4. 1 PA.C.S. § 101. Actually the publication was first designated the Con-
solidated Pennsylvania Statutes, but was later changed. Act of December 10, 1974,
P.L. -, No. 271, § 1. The PCS citation form is statutorily directed. 1 PA.C.S. §
102. All PCS provisions can be discovered by referring to appendixes and special
pamphlets following the volumes of Purdon's Statutes corresponding in number to co-
dified PCS titles. Thus, a section of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, 20
PA.C.S. §§ 101-8815, can be found in a special pamphlet following title 20 of Pur-
don's Statutes. This is true even though the Purdon's and PCS titles cover dissimilar
subjects. For example, Pennsylvania's long-arm statutes now compose chapter 83 of
title 42 (judiciary and judicial procedure) of the PCS, 42 PA.C.S. §§ 8301-11. These
sections are included in an appendix within the pocket part following title 42 (justices
of the peace) of Purdon's Statutes. Title 18 (crimes and offenses) is currently the
only PCS title that appears in hardbound volumes as a permanent part of Purdon's
Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated.




In addition, more than 120 bills have been introduced in the 1975
session of the general assembly to add PCS provisions or to amend
provisions already enacted. Although no official
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anticipates publication of PCS volumes
This comment seeks to examine and clarify certain aspects of
the codification process embodied in the PCS while it is still in its
infancy. First, article III, section 3 of the Pennsylvania constitution7
will be examined to determine the breadth of its exception that ex-
empts codification bills from its requirement that all bills contain
only one subject clearly expressed in the title. Second, the structure
of Pennsylvania's vehicle for codification, the PCS, will be described.
Third, the effect of the exception to article m, section 3 upon the
codification process, in terms of bills that properly may add PCS pro-
visions, will be explained. Fourth, another commentator's interpre-
tation and its weaknesses will be illuminated.8 Fifth, ineffective
codification will be explored. Last, the proper method of amending
PCS titles, once they have been enacted, will be discussed.
II. Article III, Section 3, As Amended
A. History
In 1864 an amendment was added to the Pennsylvania consti-
tution, which provided, "No bill shall be passed by the legislature
containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed
in its title, except appropriation bills."9  This amendment was in-
tended to curb the practice of incorporating into one bill a variety
of distinct and independent subjects of legislation and intentionally
disguising the real purpose of the bill by a misleading title or by the
comprehensive phrase "and for other purposes."' 0  Omnibus bills,
as such bills were known, not only allowed the passage of unknown
legislation, but also permitted logrolling-that is, embracing in one
bill several distinct matters, none of which could singly obtain the
assent of the legislature, and procuring its passage by combining the
minorities who favored the individual matters to form a majority that
would adopt them all." This amendment was renumbered and
7. PA. CONST. art. III, § 3 provides, "No bill shall be passed containing more
than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except a general appro-
priation bill or a bill codifying or compiling the law or a part thereof."
This comment focuses on codification of statutory law, but the exception to arti-
cle III, § 3 clearly includes the codification of case law into statutory provisions. Zei-
ter, supra note 1, at 540.
8. See notes 109-30 and accompanying text infra.
9. PA. CONST. art. XI, § 8 (1838).
10. In re Hadley, 336 Pa. 100, 107, 6 A.2d 874, 878 (1939). The Common-
wealth Court of Pennsylvania recently stated that the purpose of article I, § 3 is
to provide full notice and publicity to all proposed legislative enactments and, thus,
to prevent "sneak" legislation. Bensalem Tp. School Dist. v. County Comm'rs, 8 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 411, 419, 303 A.2d 258, 263-64 (1973).
11. BLACK'S LAW DIcIoNARY 1091 (rev. 4th ed. 1968), citing Walker v. Grif-
fith, 60 Ala. 361, 369 (1877); Commonwealth v. Barnet, 199 Pa. 161, 171-72, 48
A. 976, 977 (1901). For a discussion of logrolling, the events leading up to the
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slightly modified in the 1873 constitution. 2 Otherwise article III,
section 3 remained unchanged until 1967.1
Proposals to amend article III, section 3 have been made since
its inception. At the 1873 constitutional convention Delegate Buck-
alew pointed to a provision of the recently adopted New York con-
stitution that exempted statutory revisions from a constitutional re-
striction similar to article III, section 3. His suggestion that a similar
exception be placed in the Pennsylvania constitution, however, came
to nothing.14  A more thorough study of a proposed exception was
undertaken by the 1921 Schaffer Commission on Constitutional
Amendment and Revision.' 5 A committee proposed an express
sanction of codification: "The general assembly may from time to
time adopt codes, compilations or revisions of the existing statutory
laws of the Commonwealth or any part thereof . ... " The final
report, however, simply recommended expansion of the exception:
"No bill except general appropriation bills and codifications, compi-
lations and general revisions of existing statutory law shall be passed
containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed
in its title . ... ,"7 In 1959 the Woodside Commission on Consti-
tutional Revision' 8  recommended that article m, section 3 be
amended to exempt "bills codifying existing law" from its single sub-
ject and title notice requirements.' 9 Four years later the Pennsyl-
vania Bar Association's Project Constitution 0 report urged a similar
1864 amendment, and the proper interpretation of article III, § 3, see C. BUCKALEW,
AN ExAMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA 67-69 (1883); T. WHITE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA 213-29 (1907).
12. The provision appeared in the 1873 constitution as article III, § 3 and ex-
cepted general appropriation bills from its coverage.
13. An exception for codification and compilation bills was adopted by refer-
endum on May 16, 1967. See note 7 supra; note 22 and accompanying text infra.
14. 5 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION To AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF PENN-
SYLVANIA 243-46 (1873).
15. Created by Act of June 4, 1919, P.L. 388, No. 192; see historical note at
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, ch. 2 (1963). Justice William I. Schaffer chaired the Com-
mission.
16. 2 PROCEEDINGS, COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND REVI-
SION 790 (1920) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF SCHAFFER COMMISSION].
17. Id. at 1039.
18. Created by Act of July 15, 1957, P.L. 927, No. 400. Judge Robert E.
Woodside chaired the Commission.
19. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 62 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT OF WOODSIDE COMMISSION].
20. Project Constitution was a comprehensive study by members of the Penn-
sylvania Bar Association of the 1873 constitution and the 1959 report of the Wood-
side Commission on Constitutional Revision. Promulgated from 1961 to 1963, many
of the Project Constitution recommendations have since been made part of the Penn-
exception: "No bill shall be passed containing more than one sub-
ject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except a general
appropriation bill or a bill codifying or compiling the law or a part
thereof."'" This last proposal was adopted verbatim by the voters on
May 16, 1967, along with several other amendments to articles III,
X, and XI of the constitution.
22
B. Reason for Amendment: Abundance of Care
Case law of other jurisdictions indicates that the amendment
exempting codification and compilation bills from the requirements
of article I, section 3 was unnecessary. More than two dozen state
courts have considered whether a codification of all or part of a
state's statutory law violates constitutional requirements that a bill
have but one subject and that its subject be clearly expressed in
the title.23 No court has held that a specific exception for codifying
acts is necessary. Two rationales have been used: some courts de-
clare that constitutional restrictions do not apply to codifications or
general revisions;24 others reason that the subject of codification is
sufficiently unitary for constitutional purposes.2 5  The latter view is
more accurate because the single subject requirement does not res-
trict breadth of subject-a bill's subject may be narrow or broad
as long as it is unitary.
2 6
A leading case in this area is Central of Georgia Railway Co.
27v. State, in which the constitutionality of the Georgia Code of
1895 was challenged. The Georgia Supreme Court recognized
that an act adopting a code necessarily refers to a great many sub-
jects and contains provisions not germane to each other. The evils
sylvania constitution. For greater detail see 34 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 147-325 (1963); 33
PA. B. ASS'N Q. 14-20, 365-498 (1961-62).
21. Report of Committee No. 2 on the Legislature and Legislative Procedure,
Project Constitution, 34 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 250, 255 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Project
Constitution Report].
22. Proclamation of the Governor, P.L. 1069, July 7, 1967.
23. E.g., Ellery v. State, 42 Ariz. 79, 22 P.2d 838 (1933); In re Interrogatories
from House of Rep., 127 Colo. 160, 254 P.2d 853 (1953); Monacelli v. Grimes, 48
Del. 122, 99 A.2d 255 (1953); Central of Ga. Ry. v. State, 104 Ga. 831, 31 S.E.
531 (1898); State v. Carter, 227 La. 820, 80 So. 2d 420 (1955); City of Raton v.
Sproule, 78 N.M. 138, 429 P.2d 336 (1967); State v. Habig, 106 Ohio 151, 140 N.E.
195 (1922); State ex rel. Myers v. Wood, 154 W. Va. 431, 175 S.E.2d 637 (1970).
24. E.g., Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Meek, 294 Ky. 122, 171 S.W.2d 41
(1943); State ex rel. Colmer v. Benvenutti, 162 Miss. 313, 137 So. 537 (1931); Ey
parte Jamenez, 159 Tex. 183, 317 S.W.2d 189 (1958); McClain v. Commonwealth,
189 Va. 847, 55 S.E.2d 49 (1949).
25. E.g., Widney v. Hess, 242 Iowa 342, 45 N.W.2d 233 (1950); Duke Power
Co. v. Somerset County Bd. of Tax., 125 N.J.L. 431, 15 A.2d 460 (1940); State v.
Czarnicki, 124 N.J.L. 43, 10 A.2d 461 (1940); Chumbley v. People's Bank & Trust
Co., 166 Tenn. 35, 60 S.W.2d 164 (1933).
26. IA C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRU'TION § 28.06 (4th ed.
1972) [hereinafter cited as SANDS].
27. 104 Ga. 831, 31 S.E. 531 (1898).
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
the single subject and title notice restrictions were intended to rem-
edy,28 however, were said to be absent from an act that adopts a
code. No one is misled by a title that declares the act's purpose
to be the adoption of a code or system of laws. All the constitution
requires, said the court, is unity of purpose; single subject does not
mean a subject so simple it cannot be subdivided into topics. On
the contrary, a bill may contain any number of topics if they all can
be included in one general subject indicated by a comprehensive
title. The Georgia court, therefore, concluded that a single act em-
bodying the entire statutory law of the state was not invalid for plu-
rality of subject matter or title insufficiency.29
The reasons for prohibiting bills containing more than one sub-
ject-to prevent logrolling and to force each legislative proposal to
stand or fall on its own merits-are inapplicable when laws already
enacted are being readopted in codified form. 0 The merits of these
laws were weighed and found sufficient before their original enact-
ment; a second evaluation would be superfluous. Moreover, since
the subject of a bill adopting a code is the entire body of a state's
statutory law, a bill so identified complies with the spirit and sub-
stance of the requirement that a bill's subject be expressed in its
title.3 Any other construction of single subject and title notice
requirements will interfere with the commendable practice of incor-
porating all statutory law on one general subject in a single act, will
be contrary to the purposes of the requirements, and will hinder hon-
est legislation.
3 2
Pennsylvania courts also have spoken on this issue. In Gilbert's
Estate3 the supreme court examined and upheld the intestacy acts4
in light of article III, section 3. Although the court found that an
28. See notes 10-11 and accompanying text supra.
29. 104 Ga. at 846, 31 S.E. at 536. Another early case, Marston v. Humes,
3 Wash. 267, 28 P. 520 (1891), held that the legislature must decide what scope to
give the word "subject." Moreover, a bill's title may be as comprehensive as the leg-
islature sees fit. So long as a title relates to a unified subject, it is valid no matter
how much that subject is capable of division. Id. at 275-76, 28 P. at 523. Although
the legislature and public are not informed of the particular terms of an act entitled
a codification, they are fully informed that its one subject is the establishment of
an entire code of statute law. Id. at 276, 28 P. at 524.
30. 1A SANDS, supra note 26, at § 28.06.
31. Id.
32. 73 AM. JuR. 2d Statutes § 129 (1974), citing Chumbley v. People's Bank
& Trust Co., 166 Tenn. 35, 60 S.W.2d 164 (1933).
33. 227 Pa. 648, 76 A. 428 (1910).
34. Act of April 1, 1909, P.L 87, No. 50 (repealed 1917).
act may have more than one subject, in that constituent parts could
be separated, it discerned no constitutional infirmity if the parts are
germane to the overall purpose of the enactment.35 Other Pennsyl-
vania courts have upheld codes that clearly could have been subdi-
vided into narrower subjects.36 In Borough of Williamsburg v. Bot-
tenfield 7 the Borough Code8 was attacked for not clearly express-
ing the single subject of the act in its title.3 9 The court dismissed
this contention:
Article III, section 3. . .does not require that a general act con-
solidating many statutes enacted over a course of years, with
reference to some broad subject of legislation, shall in its title re-
fer to all other subjects collaterally affected by the passage of
the various statutes to be consolidated. Those affected by such
legislation were put on notice of its effect on them when the stat-
utes were originally enacted in compliance with [the section].
...It is -not necessary to repeat [the various titles] . .. in
the title of the consolidating act, provided the subject is germane
to the general subject of legislation ... .40
The courts of the Commonwealth have focused mainly on the clarity
of expression and title notice requirements of article III, section 3
in reviewing codification acts. Unity of subject matter could not
have been ignored completely, however, since a statutory title must
clearly express the one subject to which an act is limited.4
In view of the consistent holdings in Pennsylvania and other
states, one might inquire why the general assembly and the voters
chose to amend article III, section 3 to exempt codifications and
compilations. A similar situation existed in Alabama one hundred
years ago. Prior to 1875 the Alabama constitution read, "Each law
shall embrace but one subject .... ,,4" A number of state court
decisions had upheld acts adopting codes despite the lack of an ex-
ception from the single subject rule in favor of these acts.43 Nev-
35. 227 Pa. at 650, 76 A. at 428; accord, Blood v. Mercelliott, 53 Pa. 391, 393-
95 (1866).
36. Commonwealth v. Solley, 384 Pa. 404, 121 A.2d 169 (1956) (State High-
way Law of 1945); In re Lancaster City Ord. No. 16-1952, 374 Pa. 529, 98 A.2d
25 (1953) (Third Class City Code of 1951); Commonwealth ex rel. Raker v. Macel-
wee, 294 Pa. 569, 144 A. 751 (1929) (General Township Act of 1917); Common-
wealth ex rel. Woodruff v. Snyder, 279 Pa. 234, 123 A. 792 (1924) (Administrative
Code of 1923); Minsinger v. Rau, 236 Pa. 327, 84 A. 902 (1912) (Public School
Code of 1911); Commonwealth v. Evans, 156 Pa. Super. 321, 40 A.2d 137 (1944)
(Election Code of 1937).
37. 90 Pa. Super. 203 (1927).
38. Act of May 14, 1915, P.L. 312, No. 192 (repealed 1927).
39. The act was entitled, "An Act providing a system of government for bor-
oughs, and revising, amending, and consolidating the law relating to boroughs."
40. 90 Pa. Super. at 207.
41. See City of Wilkes-Barre v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 164 Pa. Su-
per. 210, 63 A.2d 452 (1949).
42. ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 2 (1865).
43. Bales v. State, 63 Ala. 30 (1879); Hoover v. State, 59 Ala. 57 (1877); Ex
parte Pollard, 40 Ala. 77 (1866); Dew v. Cunningham, 28 Ala. 466 (1856).
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ertheless, the corresponding provision of the new constitution of
1875 excepted "bills adopting a code, digest or revision of stat-
utes."44  The Alabama Supreme Court, reviewing these events
many years later, held that the statement of this exception in the con-
stitutional provision was not conclusive evidence that it was neces-
sary. On the contrary, the court felt that "the exception . . . was
inserted out of an abundance of caution."45  The leading authority
on statutory construction reinforces this view:
Although some state constitutions, with an abundance of care,
have authorized and indeed directed legislatures to revise and
restate the statute law in a permanent and comprehensive form,
the power is inherent in the legislature to enact law, and as a
code is a law [it is] clearly within the province of the legislature
to enact it.46
An examination of Pennsylvania sources leads to the same con-
clusion. At one point in their deliberations the 1921 Commission
on Constitutional Amendment and Revision considered a committee
report that contained the following notes: "The provision that a
codification, compilation or general revision shall be deemed to con-
tain only one subject is inserted so as to clear the present uncertainty
as to whether or not such laws contain more than one subject. 47 The
comments appended to the 1959 report of the Woodside Commis-
sion on Constitutional Revision also cited uncertainty as a reason for
amendment of article III, section 3: "The proposal removes any
doubt that it is permissible to adopt an official code, bringing to-
gether the entire body of Commonwealth statutory law of a general
and permanent nature ... ."48 In contrast, the most comprehen-
sive study of the subject did not recommend an amendment of article
III, section 3.49 Dean Jefferson B. Fordham and Professor Carroll
C. Moreland of the University of Pennsylvania Law School examined
the case law of Pennsylvania and other states and concluded that a
codification of all Pennsylvania statutes would not be at odds with
the purpose of article III, section 3.50 These authors were confident
44. ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 45.
45. Harris v. State ex rel. Williams, 228 Ala. 100, 103, 151 So. 858, 861
(1933).
46. IA SANDS, supra note 26, at § 28.05.
47. 3 REPORT OF SCHAFFER COMMISSION, supra note 16, at 391-92.
48. REPORT OF WOODSIDE COMMISSION, supra note 19, at 62.
49. Fordham & Moreland, Pennsylvania's Statutory Imbroglio: The Need of
Statute Law Revision, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1093 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Fordham
& Moreland].
50. Id. at 1107.
that a Pennsylvania court would not invalidate a codification on
grounds of plurality of subject or title insufficiency. 1 This analysis
notwithstanding, Dean Fordham and Professor Moreland realized
that the great cost of a complete statutory revision might cause the
general assembly to hesitate without a constitutional exception simi-
lar to the one proposed by the Woodside Commission a year
earlier.
52
C. The Language of the Exception
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the 1967 amendment
of article III, section 3 to exempt bills "codifying or compiling the
law or a part thereof" was a precautionary measure. This realization
is crucial in determining the scope of the exception. Because the
amendment confirmed, rather than expanded, the legislative powers
of the general assembly, the exception must be interpreted narrowly
and limited to its express terms. An expansive reading of the ex-
ception will lead to the evils at which article III, section 3 was aimed
originally,53 not the benefits sought by the 1967 amendment.
To understand the exception's scope, one must examine its lan-
guage. A code has been defined as a complete system of positive
law, scientifically arranged and promulgated by legislative author-
ity.54 Drafting a code includes compiling existing laws, systemati-
cally arranging them into chapters, subheads, tables of contents, and
indexes, harmonizing conflicts, supplying omissions, and generally
clarifying and completing a body of laws designed to regulate ex-
haustively the subjects to which it relates. 55 A compilation, on the
other hand, is merely an arrangement and classification of legislation
in -the exact form and wording in which it was enacted originally.
It simply brings together in convenient form the various acts of the
legislature over a period of time.56 Thus, a code is quite different
from a compilation. A code is broader in scope and more compre-
hensive in purpose. Its general object is to embody, as nearly as
practicable, all the statutory laws of a governmental entity. When
properly adopted by the legislature, a code is more than prima facie
evidence of the law; it is positive law itself.57 An officially or pri-
51. Id. at 1105-06.
52. Id. at 1108.
53. See notes 10-11 and accompanying text supra.
54. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 323 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
55. Gibson v. State, 214 Ala. 38, 43, 106 So. 231, 235 (1925).
56. 73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes § 129 (1974), citing Fidelity & Columbia Trust
Co. v. Meek, 294 Ky. 122, 171 S.W.2d 41 (1943).
57. Central of Ga. Ry. v. State, 104 Ga. 831, 841-42, 31 S.E. 531, 534 (1898).
Positive law is defined as law actually and specifically enacted or adopted by proper
authority for the government of an organized jural society. BLACK'S LAw DICTION-




vately prepared compilation, however, is published only to facilitate
discovery of the law. Usually a compilation does not eliminate re-
pealed laws; instead it collects all laws on the same subject regardless
of their operative effect. Even when a compilation has been given
legislative approval, it does not affect the status of the law: final au-
thority remains in the statutes as originally enacted. 58 Later use of
the terms "codification" and "code" will include "compilation."59
A term not used in the exception to article I, section 3-and,
therefore, not to be read into it-is "revision." The terms "codifica-
tion" and "revision" often are carelessly interchanged or used to ex-
plain each other."' Nevertheless, "revision," no matter how fre-
quently it may be used or confused with "codification," has an inde-
pendent meaning: to alter, amend, or change. 61 Indeed, the word
"revise" has been held to suggest fundamental change.62 A codifi-
cation, on the other hand, has been declared by Pennsylvania courts
to operate as a continuation of prior statutes and to effect no substan-
tive changes unless the codifying act or its history shows a clear in-
tention to do so.6s The principal function of a code is to reorganize
the law and state it in simpler form. Even though a statute is re-
worded, rephrased, and its sections separated by codification, the
presumption remains that the changes are made for clarity, rather
gal evidence of the text of the law. Reference to other authorities is unnecessary.
Zeiter, supra note 1, at 541.
58. IA SANDS, supra note 26, at § 28.04, citing Ashley v. City of Anchorage,
95 F. Supp. 189 (D. Alas. 1951); Coppersmith v. City & County of Denver, 156
Colo. 469, 399 P.2d 943 (1965).
59. Statutory compilations enacted as positive law are rare. In modem usage
compilation-the bringing together of all statutes on a given subject-is only one of
several essential steps in the revision or codification of statutory law.
60. E.g., ALA. Corsr. art. 4, § 45 ("Each law shall contain but one subject
except . . .bills adopting a code, digest or revision of statutes. ... ); ALAS.
CONST. art. II, § 13 ("Every bill shall be confined to one subject unless it is ...
one codifying, revising or rearranging existing laws."); MONT. CONsT. art. V, § 23
("No bill, except . . . bills for the codification and general revision of the laws, shall
be passed containing more than one subject ...."). Moreover, the terms are com-
monly used together in Pennsylvania statutes and statutory titles. E.g., PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 46, § 457 (1969) ("He [the Director of the Legislative Reference Bureau]
shall assist in or supervise. . . the compilation and preparation of any general revi-
sion and codifications of the existing law of the Commonwealth."); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 25, § 2600 (1963) ("The laws relating to general, municipal, special and primary
elections, the nomination of candidates, primary and election expenses and election
contests are hereby codified, revised and consolidated as follows.").
61. Tennessee Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Anderson County, 173 Tenn. 497, 503,
121 S.W.2d 543, 545 (1938).
62. Kelly v. Laing, 259 Mich. 212, 217, 242 N.W. 891, 892 (1932).
63. In re Cross' Estate, 278 Pa. 170, 176, 122 A. 267, 270 (1923); see Basset
v. United States, 137 U.S. 496, 506 (1890).
than a change in meaning. 64 The common use of the words "code"
and "revision" as synonyms does not mean that one implies the
other. The crucial distinction is that a revision includes substantive
changes in the law, but a codification only harmonizes, clarifies,
and simplifies existing law.6 Because the term "revision" does not
appear in the exception to article III, section 3, bills revising sub-
stantive law lie outside its scope and, therefore, remain subject to
the single subject and title notice requirements.6 6
III. Building the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
A. PCS Structure
Codification of Pennsylvania's statutory law will be a lengthy
process, accomplished by the enactment of many bills. The lan-
guage of the 1967 amendment of article III, section 3 acknowledged
and provided for this fact: it exempts bills "codifying or compiling
the law or a part thereof.'' 67  To facilitate this gradual codification,
code draftsmen in the Legislative Reference Bureau and elsewhere
64. IA SANDS, supra note 26, at §§ 28.10-.11; see City of Norwalk v. Daniele,
143 Conn. 85, 119 A.2d 732 (1955); Ahner v. Delaware Alcoh. Bev. Control
Comm'n, - Del. -, 237 A.2d 706 (1967); Zeiter, supra note 1, at 548.
65. Zeiter, supra note 1, at 548 & n.8. This distinction can be explained by
an example. Assume that two statutory definitions in different acts read as follows:
"'Crime' shall be defined as any indictable offense"; "For the purpose of this Act,
any individual who has been finally convicted of an indictable offense shall be
deemed a 'criminal.'" A codification of these statutes might produce the following
definitions: "'Crime.' Any indictable offense"; "'Criminal.' An individual finally
convicted of a crime." In a revision, on the other hand, substantive amendment of
the definitions would be permissible: "'Crime.' Any indictable or summary of-
fense"; "'Criminal.' An individual charged with the commission of a crime."
66. The Alabama constitution contains a provision similar to article III, § 3:
ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 45 (quoted, supra note 60). Its proper application was dis-
cussed at length in Gibson v. State, 214 Ala. 38, 106 So. 231 (1925). The Alabama
Supreme Court held that a bill within the exception for "bills adopting a code, digest
or revision of statutes" is one whose title follows the language of the exception. More
importantly, such a bill must deal with a body of law previously enacted and not
first presented to the legislature for enactment in the codification bill itself. Id. at
43, 106 So. at 235; see note 155 and accompanying text infra. The Alabama court
defined a code as a restatement of existing law in which only changes in language
and arrangement are made. Finally, the court noted that although the legislature
may enact bills making substantive revisions of existing laws, in so doing it must
comply with the unity of subject requirement. Id. at 43-44, 106 So. at 235; Ruud,
No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 MINN. L. REV. 489, 445 (1958).
67. PA. CONST. art. III, § 3 (emphasis added). Pennsylvania courts have up-
held several acts that revised all statutory law pertaining to a particular subject.
Cases cited note 36 supra. In other states it has been held that a bill need not
codify all of a state's statutory law to qualify as a code for the exception from subject
and title requirements. Bills codifying separate areas of the law fall within the ex-
ception. IA SANDS, supra note 26, at § 28.06, citing Uhls v. State ex rel. City of
Cheyenne, 429 P.2d 74 (Wyo. 1967). On the other hand, a bill that embraces new
substance and, therefore, is not a codification will not be upheld under the exception
even if it is called a code. IA SANDS, supra note 26, at § 28.06. A statute declaring
that it should be cited as an agricultural code and containing new legislation was held
not within the exception to the unity of subject requirement. Gibson v. State, 214
Ala. 38, 44, 106 So. 231, 235 (1925).
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
felt it desirable to provide a vehicle into which codification and revi-
sion bills could be placed. This was believed preferable to a loose
group of codes like those existing at the time.68 The name Con-
solidated Pennsylvania Statutes was chosen, but has since been
changed to Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes.69 Act 23070 pro-
vides the statutory framework into which revised and codified sub-
ject areas (called "titles") are fitted. 1  As originally enacted Act
230 was quite brief and dealt only with the form of citation for
the PCS, the format of the codification, the typographical treatment
of PCS bills, and the title headings under which all substantive
matter eventually would be placed. The draftsmen divided the en-
tire body of statutory law into seventy-nine titles.72  Some of the
titles are those used by Purdon's Statutes in its unofficial compilation
68. E.g., the Vehicle Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 101-1503 (1971); the
Penal Code, Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, No. 375 (repealed 1973 except H§ 718-
19); the Eminent Domain Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-101 to -903 (Supp.
1975); see note 36 and accompanying text supra. For greater detail on the initial
decision-making for the PCS, see Zeiter, supra note 1.
69. 1 PA.C.S. § 101. The name and citation changes were effected by Act of
December 10, 1974, P.L. -, No. 271, § 1.
To consolidate laws is to collect them in one act, implying the intention to in-
clude in this act entire control over the subject and to exclude all prior enactments.
Graham v. Fleming, 116 Mich. 571, 572-73, 74 N.W. 729, 730 (1898).
70. Act of November 25, 1970, P.L. 707, No. 230. The form and function
of Act 230 were fully explained in the Zeiter article, supra note 1, at 541-48, except
for an apparently inconsistent description of the Act's nature. At one point the au-
thor referred to Act 230 as a multisubject act, id. at 540-41, correctly stating that
the amended constitutional provision permits single subject revision bills to be drafted
as amendments to a multisubject codification act. At another point, however, he
stated that the Act deals with a single subject:
[T]he fundamental decision made with respect to codification was to avoid
making any change in the existing substantive law in the initial implementa-
tion bill. Thus, . . . [230] deals with but a single subject, i.e., the estab-
lishment of a skeleton outline of the official statutory codification.
Id. at' 542. Near the end of the article the reader is told that "the amendment's sole
office is to permit the enactment of one bill, the multisubject basic act . . . (No.
230) .... ." Id. at 548 (emphasis in original). In fact, there is no inconsistency
in these descriptions. As originally enacted Act 230 pertained to a single subject.
As substantive PCS titles were added by amendment of the Act, however, Act 230
became a codification act embracing many distinct and unrelated subjects.
71. The purpose of Act 230 is stated in its preamble:
In order to facilitiate the codification and compiling of the law of this
Commonwealth, as authorized by section 3 of Article III of the Constitution
of Pennsylvania, the following structure, which shall be implemented from
time to time hereafter by appropriate amendments to this act, is hereby es-
tablished.
72. Act of November 25, 1970, P.L. 707, No. 230, as amended, Act of Decem-
ber 10, 1974, P.L. -, No. 271, § 5; see Zeiter, supra note 1, at 542-44. A few
titles have been reserved for expansion and others are only partially substantive in
nature (e.g., title 1 (general provisions) ).
of Pennsylvania laws. Others represent subjects found unitary by
the general assembly and the courts in the past.73  The function of
Act 230 is analogous to that of a skeleton; it is given body by addi-
tion of substantive provisions drafted as amendments to Act 230
under appropriate title headings.
74
The PCS structure provided by Act 230, however, was not man-
dated by the amendment of article III, section 3. It is no more than
a legislative convenience, neither essential nor immutable. When
the codification of Pennsylvania statutes is complete or at some ear-
lier time, a future general assembly may find constant amendment
of Act 230 cumbersome. The legislature could then repeal Act 230
and declare the PCS the complete body of statute law in and of it-
self.75 Alternatively, it could divide the statute law of the Common-
wealth into several major codes.7 6  In any case, the general assembly
will remain free to act since codification of Pennsylvania statutes
does not depend on the existence of Act 230.
77
73. E.g., the Pennsylvania Election Code, Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, No.
320 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 2600-3591 (1963)), upheld under article
III, § 3 in Commonwealth v. Evans, 156 Pa. Super. 321, 40 A.2d 137 (1944); see
Zeiter, supra note 1, at 542-44.
74. An illustration of this concept is provided by the Crimes Code, Act of De-
cember 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334. The Crimes Code is entitled, "An Act amend-
ing the act of November 25, 1970 (No. 230), . . . adding provisions relating to
crimes, offenses and punishment, and making repeals." (emphasis added). Section
1 of Act 334 guided the placement of the Crimes Code into the PCS: "Title 18,
act of November 25, 1970 (No. 230), known as the 'Consolidated Pennsylvania Stat-
utes,' is amended to read:" (emphasis added).
75. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, at xii (1939):
REVISED STATUTES
ACT ADOPTING REVISED STATUTES
An Act to establish all the public statute law of a general nature of the
State of New Jersey in the form of a revision, consolidation and compila-
tion, to be known as the Revised Statutes.
BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of
New Jersey:
1. The revision, consolidation and compilation prepared under the direc-
tion of the Legislature by the Revision Commission appointed under chapter
seventy-three of the laws of one thousand nine hundred and twenty-five,.
presented to the Legislature by the Commission upon the twentieth day of
December, one thousand nine hundred and thirty-seven, be and the same
is hereby adopted as all the public statute law of the State of New Jersey
of a general nature.
2. This statute and the revision, consolidation and compilation so adopted
as aforesaid and incorporated herein shall in all respects, and whether re-
vision, consolidation or compilation, be known as the Revised Statutes.
3. The Revised Statutes as hereinbefore defined, and as hereinafter enacted,
shall take effect immediately.
76. California has a system that amounts to general codification. Its perma-
nent legislation has been separately enacted into several major codes. The New York
Consolidated Laws, which have been enacted separately over many years, are in both
design and effect a consolidation of that state's substantive statute law. Fordham &
Moreland, supra note 49, at 1109.
77. One potential challenge to the validity of the PCS calls for an examination
of article III, § 6 of the Pennsylvania constitution, which reads, "No law shall be
revived, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to




B. Bills To Add Provisions to the PCS
By applying the interpretation of article III, section 3 developed
above to the legislative process in Pennsylvania, one can discern
three types of bills that properly may add provisions to the PCS:
conventional revision bills of one subject, multisubject codification
bills, and single subject codification bills. Upon these building
blocks, and only these, can the PCS be implemented free from con-
stitutional infirmity and legislative abuse.
1. Single Subject Revision Bills.-These bills have always been
authorized by article III, section 3 .78 The legislative power to enact
them was unaffected by the 1967 amendment of that constitu-
tional provision. Revision of laws includes omission of prior stat-
utes, changing of words, phrases, and sections for harmony and bre-
vity, incorporation of new substantive matter, and physical rearrange-
ment of existing law into appropriate titles, chapters, and sections.79
The crucial distinction between revision and codification bills is that
the former make substantive changes in the law, the latter do not. °
be reenacted and published at length." It has been suggested that when a statute
is repealed, revised or codified, and reenacted as part of the PCS, changes made dur-
ing revision or codification must be shown by underscoring or italicizing added mat-
ter and bracketing deleted matter.
This assertion is without merit. Several Pennsylvania cases have held that an
act whose purpose, meaning, and full scope are apparent on its face is not violative
of article III, § 6, although it may operate to alter, extend, or repeal a prior act.
E.g., L.J.W. Realty Corp. v. City of Phila., 390 Pa. 197, 134 A.2d 878 (1957); Young
v. Fetterolf, 320 Pa. 289, 182 A. 676 (1936); Commonwealth v. Tassone, 246 Pa.
543, 92 A. 713 (1914); Rankin v. Chester Mun. Auth., 165 Pa. Super. 438, 68 A.2d
458 (1949). A statute enacted as original and independent legislation, complete in
itself as far as it applies to the subject matter properly embraced within its title, and
requiring no reference to any other statute to render it intelligible and to determine
its meaning and scope does not fall within the spirit or meaning of the constitutional
provisions prohibiting amendment by reference to title only and requiring amended
statutes to be reenacted and published at length. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 262 (1953).
Act 230 is free from article III, § 6 because it is an act complete in itself.
An attempt to avoid an article III, § 6 challenge is made by the following pro-
vision:
In printing as much of any statute as adds an entire title, part, article, chap-
ter, subchapter or other major subdivision to the [PCS], the Director [of
the Legislative Reference Bureau] shall cause such addition to be printed in
Roman type without underscoring, and in printing as much of any statute
as deletes or repeals an entire title, part, article, chapter, subchapter or other
major subdivision of the [PCS], the Director shall not cause to be printed
the provisions which have been deleted or repealed. ...
1 PA.C.S. § 1104(b).
78. See notes 33-41 and accompanying text supra; Zeiter, supra note 1, at 540.
79. See Pratt Inst. v. New York City, 183 N.Y. 151, 75 N.E. 1119 (1905);
White v. McClure, 1 Ohio Op. 127 (C.P. Hamilton 1934); American Indem. Co. v.
City of Austin, 112 Tex. 239, 246 S.W. 1019 (1922); Waters v. Gunn, 218 S.W.2d
235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
80. See notes 60-66 and accompanying text supra.
Because revision bills do not fall within the scope of the excep-
tion to article I, section 3, they must conform to that section's single
subject and title notice requirements. The first question to be re-
solved, then, is how the word "subject" is defined. 1 Pennsylvania
courts have allowed the general assembly considerable latitude by
liberally construing article III, section 3 to avoid hindering honest
legislation. 2  Although an act that refers to two or more distinct
subjects is unconstitutional, 8 a statute will satisfy the single subject
rule, no matter how many different matters it relates to, if they are
all cognate branches of the same general subject.8 4  In Common-
wealth v. Joness5 the court stated,
The unity of the subject of a statute is to be determined by
its paramount purpose rather than by the details through which
that purpose is to be accomplished. The subject may have but
one object, while the measures necessary for the attainment of
the object may necessarily embrace many subordinate subjects,
differing -in their nature and particular effect, yet all contributing
to it, and comprised within the principal subject. Everything
which the nature of the subject of a title reasonably suggests, as
necessary or appropriate for the accomplishment of its expressed
purpose, is sufficiently indicated by such title.88
The Alabama Supreme Court has elaborated on this theme:
It is impossible to prescribe any standard of particularity for the
legislature. The constitution has not attempted to do so. It ex-
acts from the legislature an announcement in the title of the sub-
ject, but does not dictate any degree of particularity. This is a
matter left to legislative discretion.8 7
The Supreme Court of Washington made it clear, however, that the
legislature cannot disregard the one subject restriction: "[T]he leg-
islature must be the judge of the scope which they will give to the
word 'subject,' and . . . so long as the title embraces but one sub-
ject, it is not inimical to such constitutional provision. ... "88
81. Objective standards for the definition of subject are difficult to determine.
What may seem a unitary subject to one draftsman may embrace several subjects in
another draftsman's mind. Education provides an example. Although most legisla-
tive draftsmen, legislators, and judges are likely to find the broad subject of education
sufficiently unitary, others may feel that the subjects of campus police and busing
of elementary students are widely divergent. See notes 150-53 and accompanying
text inf ra.
82. Kotch v. Middle Coal Field Poor Dist., 329 Pa. 390, 197 A. 334 (1938);
Mallinger v. City of Pittsburgh, 316 Pa. 257, 175 A. 525 (1934); Kelley v. Township
of Mayberry, 154 Pa. 440, 26 A. 595 (1893); Blood v. Mercelliott, 53 Pa. 391
(1866).
83. Payne v. School Dist., 168 Pa. 386, 389-91, 31 A. 1072, 1074-75 (1895).
84. Kelley v. Township of Mayberry, 154 Pa. 440, 448, 26 A. 595, 597-98
(1893).
85. 4 Pa. Super. 362 (1897).
86. Id. at 368.
87. Ex parte Pollard, 40 Ala. 77, 98-99 (1866).




In constructing the PCS the general assembly has had to deter-
mine the scope of the word "subject." PCS title headings are what
that body believes to be single subjects. This legislative determina-
tion is important because bill draftsmen need a reference tool to
gauge how broad the subject of a revision bill may be without
violating article III, section 3. Absent a showing that a title is too
broadly drawn, Pennsylvania courts should provide this reference
tool by adopting PCS title headings as parameters of the single sub-
ject test.
89
Article III, section 3 also requires the title of a single subject
revision bill to express its subject clearly. Like the single subject
rule, courts have liberally construed this clarity of expression re-
quirement. The title of an act need not be an -index of its provisions
or a synopsis of its contents; so long as it indicates the general subject
to which all the act's provisions are incidental or germane, it is suffi-
cient.9" A short, general, comprehensive title is more desirable than
a long one that attempts to point out the details of a statute.91 An
act will not be invalidated for violating the title notice requirement
unless a substantive matter entirely unrelated to the named legisla-
tion is included.' All that is required is that the title put persons
of a reasonably inquiring mind on notice of the act's general subject
matter.13  Furthermore, a table of contents included in a bill is con-
sidered part of the title for constitutional purposes.94
Legislative abuse of single subject revision bills is possible. Al-
though logrolling is prevented by the single subject rule, the great
size of a revision bill may have harmful effects. 95 Substantive
changes buried in a completely restructured body of statutory law
often are unnoticed by the general assembly in its consideration of
a revision bill. Since substantive change is the key characteristic of
revision bills, however, the general assembly has no choice but to
marshal its resources to discover and study these changes. Ade-
89. See notes 150-53 and accompanying text infra.
90. McSorley v. Fitzgerald, 359 Pa. 264, 272, 59 A.2d 142, 146 (1948); Bensa-
lem Tp. School Dist. v. County Comm'rs, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 411, 419-20, 303
A.2d 258, 264 (1973).
91. Minsinger v. Rau, 236 Pa. 327, 336, 84 A. 902, 904 (1912).
92. In re Gumpert's Estate, 343 Pa. 405, 407, 23 A.2d 479, 480 (1942).
93. Id.
94. Bridgeford v. Groh, 102 Pa. Super. 138, 144, 156 A. 612, 614 (1931), aff'd,
305 Pa. 554, 158 A. 260 (1932).
95. The Crimes Code, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, in bill
form was 221 pages in length.
quate titles, tables of contents, source notes, and disposition tables
prepared by the draftsmen and attached to the bill can facilitate the
necessary examination.
9 6
Many areas of Pennsylvania statutory law are overdue for revi-
sion as well as codification. The preferable means of adding these
subjects to the PCS will be single subject revision bills. One of the
advantages of these bills is that generally they will fall within the
jurisdiction of a single legislative committee in each house and
thereby speed legislative consideration. 97  Moreover, although the
size of many revision bills will make thorough examination burden-
some, a division of the subject matter into several bills may be coun-
terproductive. Statutory construction problems may arise from the
relationship of the individual bills to each other and the implied re-
peals their separate enactments might effect.98 Furthermore, of a
package of five bills to revise a single subject, one or more might
never be enacted, thereby adding to the confusion. Finally, such
a package of bills could become the focus of logrolling (albeit within
one subject), a practice that article III, section 3 was adopted to pre-
vent.99
2. Multisubject Codification Bills.-The second permissible build-
ing block for the PCS is the multisubject codification bill. The
1967 amendment of article III, section 3 was intended to provide
the general assembly with the power to adopt such legislation. By
definition, a multisubject codification bill must redraft in code format
two or more distinct and unrelated subjects without change in sub-
stantive law. 10 The single subject and title notice requirements of
article III, section 3 do not apply to this bill. 10" Nor is it necessary
that a codification bill codify complete titles. A bill codifying only
one chapter in each of several titles is valid, whether the chapters
are related or not, because the exception to article I, section 3 al-
lows the general assembly to codify both broad and narrow areas of
statutory law.'02
96. For forms and regulations on the drafting of bills that add, amend, or de-
lete PCS provisions, see 101 PA. CODE §§ 21.1-27.135, known as the Consolidated
Pennsylvania Statutes Style Manual.
97. Zeiter, supra note 1, at 541.
98. See Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 PA.C.S. §§ 1501-1991.
99. See note 11 and accompanying text supra. For an example of logrolling
within one subject see S.B. 714, Pa. Gen. Assem., 159th Sess. (1975). This bill was
introduced to create new positions on the common pleas benches of certain counties.
As the bill underwent legislative consideration, however, it was amended several times
to add more counties to the list.
100. See notes 60-66 and accompanying text supra.
101. This constitutional provision contains an exemption for bills "codifying or
compiling the law or a part thereof." Thus, plurality of subject matter and lack of
title clarity are constitutionally valid in these bills. A purposely misleading title,
however, would be an abuse of the exception and might be invalid for that reason.




The potential for abuse of multisubject codification bills is
sharply limited. Logrolling will be ineffectual. These bills are om-
nibus by design.'03 Since no substantive changes are to be made,
a would-be logroller will have nothing with which to bargain. Greater
dangers are posed by unintentional errors of the code draftsmen and
surreptitious revision. Codification bills are presumed to make no
changes in existing law unless the intent to do so is clear. 04 But
to protect itself further from these dangers, the general assembly can
buttress this presumption by declaring conclusively that no substan-
tive change is intended by the bill's enactment. This declaration
could be set out in the codification bill'0 5 or the presumption of
no substantive change could be enacted as a rule of statutory con-
struction applicable to all multisubject codification bills. This pro-
tection from both inadvertent and intentional changes in the sub-
stantive effect of codified statutes will free the general assembly
from extensive scrutiny and will expedite the codification process.
Two other reasons for reluctance to enact multisubject codification
bills can be removed by a declaration of no substantive change: their
unwieldy size and their diversity of subject matter. If a bill merely
codifies parts of the law, its size is irrelevant; operation of prior law
will continue unchanged. Similarly, a bill that merely codifies laws
on agriculture, amusements, and administrative law need not be
studied by three different legislative committees in each house. One
perusal should suffice.'06
3. Single Subject Codification Bills.-The third means of add-
ing PCS provisions is the single subject codification bill. The single
subject and title notice requirements of article III, section 3 also have
no application to this bill.107 Most of the practical considerations
relative to multisubject codification bills also apply to single subject
codification bills.'0 " The great advantage of the latter type is the
103. See notes 10-11 and accompanying text supra.
104. See notes 63-64 and accompanying text supra.
105. See Act of June 30, 1972, P.L. 508, No. 164, § 4.
106. One problem that cannot be disposed of easily is that created when a small
part of one subject is codified in a multisubject codification bill. A practitioner look-
ing for that segment may find it repealed, but be unable to find where, or if, the
segment has been reenacted and published in codified form. This problem will de-
crease in the future. As the codification effort goes forward, practitioners will turn
first to PCS volumes to locate statutory law.
107. See note 101 supra.
108. See notes 100-06 and accompanying text supra. An example of a single
subject codification bill is Act of June 30, 1972, P.L 508, No. 164, known as the
.135
relative ease with which it can pass through the general assembly.
Such a bill is likely to be no larger than a revision bill on the same
subject and may be considerably smaller. One committee in each
house normally will have jurisdiction over its subject matter. As a
mere codification of existing law, the bill is unlikely to create suspi-
cions or encounter impediments to its smooth flow from introduction
to signature by the Governor.
C. Another View
At least one commentator has reached a different interpretation
of article III, section 3 and the types of bills that properly can add
PCS provisions. William E. Zeiter, Esquire, one of Pennsylvania's
leading code draftsmen and a major force behind the PCS, has writ-
ten an instructive introduction to the codification effort.1 °9 In that
article Mr. Zeiter pointed to a fourth type of building block for the
PCS: a bill that revises one subject and codifies one or more oth-
ers. 1
10
1. The Theory.-Mr. Zeiter interpreted the 1967 amendment
of article III, section 3 as an expansion, rather than a confirma-
tion, of the general assembly's powers. In describing the events
leading up to the amendment, he noted that the Pennsylvania Bar
Association's Project Constitution"' did not accept verbatim the
Woodside Commission's recommended exception for "bills codifying
existing law."' 12  Instead the Project Constitution report recom-
mended that the exception read "a bill codifying or compiling the
law or a part thereof." 113 Mr. Zeiter reasoned that the later report
"expanded" the earlier recommendation by "urging a somewhat dif-
ferent result."' 14  This different result apparently required an ex-
pansive reading of the exception to article III, section 3 and led Mr.
Zeiter to state that
a bill to change [i.e., revise] the law on one subject would be
valid, although the bill simultaneously complied [i.e., codified]
existing statutory provisions on two or more subjects, for exam-
ple, the act of November 15, 1972 (No. 271) (revising certain
corporation laws and codifying and compiling various related
legislation) but a bill changing the law on two or more subjects
would be unconstitutional. 115
Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code. Only a limited number of minor substantive
changes were made in its codification. See id. § 4.
109. Zeiter, supra note 1. A revised and corrected version of Mr. Zeiter's article
can be found in an appendix within the pocket part to title 1 of Purdon's Statutes.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. I (Supp. 1975).
110. Id. at 548.
11I. Project Constitution Report, supra note 21, at 255.
112. REPORT OF WOODSIDE COMMISSION, supra note 19, at 62.
113. Project Constitution Report, supra note 21, at 255.
114. Zeiter, supra note 1, at 540.
115. Id. at 548. The parenthetical example did not appear in the original Zeiter
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This author respectfully declines to follow the view taken in Mr.
Zeiter's article. It does not appear that the Project Constitution re-
port intended a result different from that reached by the Woodside
Commission. The comments to the Woodside Commission report
noted that the exception simply "removes all doubt that it is permis-
sible to adopt an official code,"11 thereby implying that the excep-
tion was probably unnecessary. The comments also stated that a
codification would make no change in existing law, but would merely
bring together laws existing at the time of codification. Although
the Project Constitution report recommended a different phrasing of
the exception, the changes must be regarded as only stylistic im-
provements.
No comments whatsoever were appended to the Project Consti-
tution recommendation; it is thus difficult to decipher its intent. Two
factors, however, lead to the conclusion that an expansion of the
Woodside Commission report was not intended. First, the Schaffer
Commission used the phrase "codifications, compilations and general
revisions of existing statute law" in its recommended exception to
article III, section 3.117 Had the Project Constitution committee de-
sired to expand the scope of the exception to include revisions, it
too would have included the words "general revision" or, at least,
appended comments to that effect. Second, the Project Constitution
report, while it deleted "existing law" from the Woodside Commis-
sion's phrasing, also recommended the addition of "or compiling the
law or a part thereof."1 18  A compilation is a mere arrangement of
existing statutes without change in form, style, wording, or mean-
ing. '1 9 The addition of the word "compiling" to the phrase "bills
codifying," therefore, cannot be interpreted as expanding the scope
of the exception.120  The unexplained deletion of "existing law"
article, supra note 1. The revised version printed by Purdon's Statutes added it. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. I (Special Pamphlet 1973).
This assertion is endorsed by its inclusion in the Consolidated Pennsylvania Stat-
utes Style Manual promulgated by the Legislative Reference Bureau. 101 PA. CODE
§ 23.241 (a). That some doubt exists among draftsmen in the Bureau can be gleaned
from another statement in the same section. "However, the practice of including
more than one subject in a bill that makes changes in substantive law should be
avoided even though it might otherwise be constitutional." Id.
116. REPORT OF WOODSmE COMMISSION, supra note 19, at 62.
117. REPORT OF SCHAFFER COMMISSION, supra note 16, at 1039.
118. Project Constitution Report, supra note 21, at 255.
119. See notes 56, 58-59 and accompanying text supra.
120. Compilation is simply one of several steps in the codification of statutory
law. Of compilation, codification, and revision, compilation effects the least change
in existing law-mere rearrangement. The inclusion of "compilation" in the excep-
should hardly be given greater effect. In the absence of evidence
to the contrary, one must conclude that the principle embodied in
the Woodside report-that the exception to article III, section 3
would allow codification of existing law without substantive change
-was the basis for the Project Constitution recommendation despite
the rewording of the latter.
Furthermore, a constitutional interpretation that would author-
ize bills to revise one subject and codify others (i.e., revision-plus-
codification bills) cannot be justified. The language of the excep-
tion to article III, section 3 controls its scope. It exempts general
appropriation bills and bills "codifying or compiling the law or a part
thereof." Revision bills of any type are not included in the excep-
tion and, therefore, are subject to the single subject and title notice
requirements. A bill that revises one subject and codifies a second,
third, and fourth is manifestly plural in nature. Plurality of subject
matter violates article III, section 3 and such a bill must fall. A bill
cannot be governed partially by the single subject rule (the revised
subject of a revision-plus-codification bill) and partially by the ex-
ception to that rule (the codified subjects). An analogous interpre-
tation would allow a general appropriation bill, which like a codifi-
cation bill is exempted from article M, section 3, to be tacked onto
a bill that also revised the single subject of burial grounds. This
result would mock the purposes of the single subject and title notice
requirements 121 and the exceptions thereto.
2. The Result.-The practical dangers and constitutional weak-
nesses of bills that revise one subject and codify others can best be
illustrated by an example. Fortunately, the Pennsylvania Assembly
has supplied one. Act 271122 is entitled as follows:
AN ACT
Amending the act of November 25, 1970 (P.L. 707, No. 230)
S. . , adding provisions relating to burial grounds, corporations,
including corporations not-for-profit, educational institutions,
private police, certain charitable or eleemosynary institutions,
certain nonprofit insurers, service of process on certain nonresi-
dent persons, names, prescribing penalties and making repeals.
Indiscernible from this title is that the provisions relating to corpora-
tions are revised, while those relating to other subjects are codi-
fied.'23 Thus, Act 271, which the Zeiter article cited as an exam-
ple,' 24 is an act revising one subject and codifying others.
tion, therefore, can hardly be interpreted to free revision bills from the requirements
of article III, § 3.
121. See notes 10-11 and accompanying text supra.
122. Act of November 15, 1972, P.L. 1063, No. 271.
123. Zeiter, supra note 1, at 548; see note 115 supra. Act 271 is said to be an
act "revising certain corporation laws and codifying and compiling various related
legislation." Id.
124. Id.; see note 115 supra.
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Note that the Act's title does not state which provisions are re-
vised or that any provisions are revised. Additionally, the title re-
cites "educational institutions," but Act 271 adds no substantive PCS
provisions corresponding to this item.125 One might well ask if this
title meets the constitutional requirement of fair notice of the real
subject of the act.' 26 Beyond title insufficiency the constitutionality
of Act 271 is far from certain. Although labeled a revision of one
subject and a codification of others, 2 7 the Act revises both title 15
(corporations and unincorporated associations) and title 42 (judici-
ary and judicial procedure) .128 Even under the Zeiter interpreta-
tion, "a bill changing the law on two or more subjects ... [is] un-
constitutional."' 29 A claim that the Act relates to a single subject' 8
125. There are, however, transitional provisions relating to the regulation of in-
corporated, degree-granting institutions. Act of November 15, 1972, P.L. 1063, No.
271, §§ 3-4.
126. See Booth & Flinn v. Miller, 237 Pa. 297, 85 A. 457 (1912); Page v. Carr,
232 Pa. 371, 81 A. 430 (1911); Blood v. Mercelliott, 53 Pa. 391 (1866).
127. Zeiter, supra note 1, at 548; see notes 123-24 and accompanying text supra.
128. Deep within Act 271 is a revision of Pennsylvania's long-arm statutes, codi-
fied as chapter 83 (bases of jurisdiction) of title 42 of the PCS. In Aquarium
Pharm., Inc. v. Industrial Press. & Packaging, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. Pa. 1973),
the court found that 42 PA.C.S. § 8309(a), which deals with the crucial definition
of doing business, differed substantially from its predecessor statute.
The amended statute, § 8309, extends the reach of [former PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15], § 2011(c) by transferring the last sentence of § 2011(c)
from a definitional clause which was to be read in conjunction with other
requirements into an independent clause upon which jurisdiction could be
founded. No longer is intention a necessary prerequisite to the imposition
of jurisdiction; the fact of the shipment into the Commonwealth, standing
by itself, subjects the acting corporation or entity to the reach of the § 8309
'long-arm' statute.
Id. at 443. For an in-depth examination of long-arm jurisdiction in Pennsylvania
see Comment, Pennsylvania's New Long-Arm Statute: Extended Jurisdiction over
Foreign Corporations, 79 DICK. L. REV. 51 (1974).
Also, some of the provisions of chapter 83 relating to jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent individuals may have been revised slightly by Act 271. Compare 42 PA.C.S.
§ 8307 with Act of July 1, 1970, P.L. 444, No. 152, § 6. Furthermore, the source
of 42 PA.C.S. § 8308 as applied to individuals is unclear.
129. Zeiter, supra note 1, at 548.
130. In a recent letter to this author, Mr. Zeiter, one of the draftsmen of Act
271, asserted that the Act satisfies the "old-fashioned" single subject test of article
111, § 3, rather than the exception thereto. Letter from William E. Zeiter, Esquire,
to Charles W. Rubendall II, August 20, 1975. He contended that no subject was
introduced in Act 271 that did not appear in the Nonprofit Corporation Law, Act
of May 5, 1933, P.L. 289, No. 105 (repealed 1972). Mr. Zeiter then stated, some-
what inconsistently, that "we expanded our theme from 'nonprofit corporation law'
to 'corporation law with special emphasis on nonprofit.'" Letter, supra. Thus, the
revision of Pennsylvania's long-arm statutes, see note 128 and accompanying text
supra, is said to be an extension of long-arm power over corporations in a corpora-
tion act. Finally, Mr. Zeiter noted that the "intellectual problem" created by Act 271
will be mooted once the non-title 15 provisions are repealed and replaced by com-
plete codifications of their respective titles. Id.
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also must fail because Act 271 includes provisions of title 9 (burial
grounds) and provisions of title 42 dealing with nonresident individ-
uals. Clearly these matters lie outside the single subject of corpora-
tions.
A final practical problem not demonstrated by Act 271 con-
cerns legislative procedure. The duality of a revision-plus-codifica-
tion bill may prevent proper legislative scrutiny. A revised subject
presented to the general assembly as part of a revision-codification
package is less likely to receive the independent consideration it
would receive if it were introduced as a separate bill. Such a bill
might be treated as pure codification and enacted without examina-
tion. On the other hand, the reverse could occur: legislative oppo-
sition to the revised portion might cause the defeat of the otherwise
acceptable codified subjects in the bill.
D. Ineffective Codification
Another problem of which code draftsmen should be aware is
ineffective codification. Because many areas of the law are in con-
stant flux, their codification or revision presents special burdens. One
burden is created by section 1952 of title 1 of the PCS, which pro-
vides,
Whenever any existing statute, incorporated into and re-
pealed by a code, is also amended by other legislation enacted at
the same General Assembly, such separate amendment shall be
construed to be in force, notwithstanding the repeal by the code
of the statute such other legislation amends, and such amend-
ment shall be construed to prevail over the corresponding provi-
sions of the code.1
3
1
Thus, to the extent a code provision varies from a recent amendment
to the statute from which the code provision was derived, the code
provision is inoperative and must yield to the amended statute. This
section of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 has not been ex-
amined by the courts since its enactment, but its predecessor stat-
ute13 2 was applied in a few cases. 13  There is every reason to be-
lieve that Pennsylvania courts will give full effect to its unambiguous
Notwithstanding this analysis Mr. Zeiter's argument that Act 271 is a single sub-
ject revision act cannot stand. There is simply no connection between a revision of
corporation law and the subjects of burial grounds and service of process on nonresi-
dent individuals that will satisfy article 1II, § 3.
131. 1 PA.C.S. § 1952. This provision was derived from the Statutory Construc-
tion Act, Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019, No. 282, § 72 (repealed 1972). The com-
ment to this section read, "Although contrary to existing law, this section would ex-
press the real intention of the Legislature." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 572, comment
(1969). This assertion is doubtful.
132. Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019, No. 282, § 72 (repealed 1972).
133. Commonwealth v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 392 Pa. 339, 140 A.2d 854 (1958);
City of Wilkes-Barre v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 164 Pa. Super. 210, 63 A.
2d 452 (1949); Scott v. McCloskey, 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 491 (C.P. McKean 1956); Met-
ropolitan Edison Co. v. Berks County, 59 Pa. D. & C. 287 (C.P. Berks 1947).
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meaning and invalidate any PCS provision derived from a recently
amended statute to the extent the PCS provision is inconsistent with
the recent amendment.
One frequently amended body of law is that relating to crimes,
offenses, and punishments. This subject was revised in 1972 by Act
33434 and now composes title 18 (crimes and offenses) of the
PCS.'35  Prior to its enactment of Act 334, which is commonly
known as the Crimes; Code, the 1971-72 General Assembly had
amended several statutes that were later repealed, revised, and reen-
acted in title 18. If section 1952 of the Statutory Construction Act
had been applicable, the corresponding provisions of title 18 might
have been rendered inoperative. The draftsmen of the Crimes
Code, however, were aware of this problem. To avoid it, they in-
serted the following provision in Act 334:
Section 4. Sections 72 [now 1 Pa.C.S. § 1952] and 94
[now 1 Pa.C.S § 1974] of the Statutory Construction Act shall
not be applicable to any provision of Title 18 . . . as added by
this act, except Article G (relating to miscellaneous offenses) of
Part II (relating to definition of specific offenses).' 36
Assuming that this suspension of the operation of section 1952 was
valid,"3 7 the draftsmen of the Crimes Code successfully made its pro-
visions prevail over inconsistent ones contained in recently amended
statutes. Because miscellaneous offenses were left subject to section
1952,138 however, at least one instance of ineffective codification has
resulted. Section 6903 (railroad employee abandoning train) reads,
A person is guilty of a summary offense if he, being a loco-
motive engineer or other railroad employe engaged in any strike,
or with a view to incite others to such strike or in furtherance of
any combination or preconcerted arrangement with any other
person to bring about a strike, abandons the locomotive engine
in his charge, when attached either to a passenger or freight train,
at any place other -than the scheduled or otherwise appointed
destination of such train, or refuses or neglects to continue to dis-
charge his duty, or to proceed with said train to the place of des-
tination.'
3 9
134. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334.
135. 18 PA.C.S. §§ 101-7505.
136. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 4.
137. Section 4 of the Crimes Code suspended the applicability of §H 72, 94 of
the Statutory Construction Act of 1937. See note 131 supra. This act was repealed,
revised, and reenacted in slightly different form on the same day and shortly before
the Crimes Code (Act 334) was enacted. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1339, No.
290, § 4(8). Application of 1 PA.C.S. § 1937 to § 4 of the Crimes Code, however,
prevented any potential problem.
138. 1 PA.C.S. § 1952.
139. 18 PA.C.S. § 6903. Emphasis is added to show the differences between §
This provision of title 18 was derived from section 662 of the Penal
Code,14 which was amended 4' less than two months before its at-
tempted repeal, revision, and reenactment by Act 334. Section
1952 of the Statutory Construction Act requires, therefore, that the
Crimes Code provision quoted above must yield to the following pro-
vision:
Whoever, being a locomotive engineer or other railroad
employee engaged in any strike, abandons the locomotive engine
in his charge, when attached to a passenger train, at any place
other than the scheduled or otherwise appointed destination of
such train is guilty of a summary offense, and upon conviction
thereof, shall pay a fine of one hundred dollars ($100).142
Care by code draftsmen can prevent virtually all ineffective
codification. 43  Nevertheless, in a rapidly changing area of the law,
suspension of the operation of sections 1952 and 1974 of the Statu-
tory Construction Act may be necessary.
IV. Amendment of PCS Provisions
The final question to be addressed concerns the proper method
of amending codified or revised provisions once they are placed in
the PCS. In current practice all bills that either add provisions to
the PCS or amend existing PCS provisions are drafted as amend-
ments to Act 230.1" Part IV of this comment deals only with the
latter-bills amending PCS provisions already in place.
These bills are governed by the constitutional requirements and
rules of statutory construction applicable to all amendatory acts.145
6903 and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4662 (App. 1973); see note 142 and accompany-
ing text infra.
140. Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, No. 375 (repealed 1973 except §§ 718-
19).,
141. Act of October 18, 1972, P.L. 971, No. 237, § 1.
142. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4662 (App. 1973) (emphasis added); see note
139 and accompanying text supra.
143. A related problem is created by 1 PA.C.S. § 1974:
Whenever a statute repeals any provision of another statute incorpo-
rated into a code adopted by the same General Assembly, the statute re-
pealing the provision so incorporated into the code shall be construed to
effect a repeal of the corresponding provision of the code.
144. Act of November 25, 1970, P.L. 707, No. 230; see notes 70-74 and accom-
panying text supra.
145. Zeiter, supra note 1, at 548. Acts amending PCS provisions are governed
by article III, § 6 (quoted, supra note 77), which requires amended portions of stat-
utes to be published at length so that all may see the changes. An act amending
another is by definition not an act complete in itself and, therefore, cannot be ex-
empted from article III, § 6 on those grounds. See note 77 supra. Nor does 1 PA.
C.S. § 1104 permit amendments to PCS provisions to be published without the usual
underscoring, italics, and bracketing. That provision concerns only addition or re-
peal of major PCS subdivisions and not substantive amendments thereto. Thus, it
appears that amendments to codifications, as opposed to codifications themselves, are
subject to this constitutional restriction.
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Article III, section 3 exempts only general appropriation and codifi-
cation bills from its requirements. Since amendatory acts are out-
side the scope of this exception, the constitution requires them to
contain only one subject and to express that subject clearly in their
titles. The Zeiter article supports this conclusion, stating that to
the extent subsequent amendments to PCS titles make substantive
changes in the law, they must satisfy the preexisting single subject
and title notice tests.' 46 Furthermore, the provisions of an amenda-
tory act must be germane to the subject matter, scope, and purpose
of the amended act.'4 7  In the event that an act as amended relates
to distinct and disassociated subjects, the amendatory act that has
caused this condition must fall as violative of the constitutional prohi-
bition. 148 This restriction does not apply, however, to Act 230.149
Implementation of the PCS provides a good opportunity to re-
think certain bill-drafting techniques. Legislative draftsmen refuse to
place amendments to more than one act in a single bill, even though
the amendments are perfectly singular in nature and germane to the
various acts amended. An illustration is the recent attempt to create
a separate corrections department in Pennsylvania. Four bills have
been introduced to construct a single department: one to amend the
Administrative Code, one to amend the Civil Service Act, one to fix
the salary of the department head, and one to create the department
itself.150 Although this act-equals-subject formula provides drafts-
146. Zeiter, supra note 1, at 548.
147. Commonwealth v. DePofi, 362 Pa. 229, 244, 66 A.2d 649, 657, cert. de-
nied, 338 U.S. 852 (1949).
148. Commonwealth ex rel. O'Malley v. Beck, 58 Lack. 241, 246-47 (Pa. C.P.
1957). The Act of May 8, 1929, P.L. 1643, No. 510 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, §§ 30781-95 (1957) ), created a single tax office in cities of the second class
A. The Act of July 17, 1953, P.L. 467, No. 114, sought to amend the 1929 Act.
Because the subject of this amendatory act related to matters going to the very core
of government in second class A cities, the amended 1929 Act related to distinct and
disassociated subjects. Consequently, the amendatory act that had caused this condi-
tion was held violative of article III, § 3. Commonwealth ex rel. O'Malley v. Beck,
supra at 247.
149. Act 230 is a multisubject codification act and falls within an exception for
bills "codifying or compiling the law or a part thereof." PA. CONST. art. In, § 3.
150. S.B. 132-35, Pa. Gen. Assem., 159th Sess. (1975).
The opposite problem is demonstrated by H.B. 94, Pa. Gen. Assem., 159th
Sess. (1975): a bill that amends a lengthy codified act by making two or more unre-
lated changes or additions. This bill seeks to amend the Administrative Code of
1929, Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, No. 175, by adding sections on homosexual
employees and busing of public school students and by amending a section on college
campus police. Although the unrelated changes may be germane to the general sub-
ject of the Administrative Code, they are not germane to each other. It can be ar-
men with a reference tool in determining a bill's unity of subject mat-
ter, it is an oversimplification. A more flexible measure of single
subject must be adopted. As discussed above,151 the proper guide-
line for determining singleness of subject should be the parameters
of a PCS title, absent a showing that the title is too broadly or nar-
rowly drawn.
Legislative draftsmen should resist the temptation, however, to
exchange the act-equals-subject formula for an inflexible title-
equals-subject rule in drafting PCS bills. It will often be desirable
to amend more than one PCS title with a single bill. Indeed, one
of the great advantages of codifying all of the Commonwealth's statu-
tory law in a unitary framework is -that one bill may be drafted to
amend any number of titles as long as the bill's subject is singular.
"For example, if the name of a court or agency is to be changed,
a single bill will be drawn amending the [PCS] at each point where
the name is to be changed."' 52  A flexible determination of subject
will add greatly to the benefits of codification. 53
gued that this amendatory bill's diversity of subject matter fails to satisfy the single
subject rule.
The anomalous situations above illustrate the extremes reached by inflexible ad-
herence to the act-equals-subject formula. Both should be avoided by legislative
draftsmen, if possible. It is clear, however, that the ability to make scattered and
unrelated amendments within a legislatively or judicially approved single subject is
a practical necessity and enhances legislative efficiency. The practice illustrated by
the corrections department bills, on the other hand, cannot be similarly justified: it
retards legislative action since four bills, instead of one, must gain legislative and gu-
bernatorial approval. Furthermore, the possibility exists that one of the bills will
not be enacted and the others will be useless without it. Consider the example of
H.B. 889, 1468, Pa. Gen. Assem., 157th Sess. (1973). The two bills were designed
to establish a program permitting physicians' assistants to perform certain medical
services. House bill 1468 sought to amend the repealed Medical Practice Act, Act
of June 3, 1911, P.L. 639, No. 246 (repealed 1974), while House bill 889 was to
be an original act carrying the substantive portions of the program. At the end of
the 1973-74 General Assembly, House bill 1468 had been approved by the legislature,
but House bill 889 had not. As the former was useless and potentially counter-
productive without the latter, the Governor had no choice but to veto House bill
1468. Veto No. 28, P.L. -, December 30, 1974.
151. See notes 81-89 and accompanying text supra.
152. Zeiter, supra note 1, at 548.
153. See 101 PA. CODE §§ 23.241(b)-(d):
(b) Determination of one subject.-In general, the headings of the
various titles of the [PCS] will serve as a sufficient reference for classifying
the subject thus permitting amendments to any of the provisions of the par-
ticular title resulting in a change in substantive law. At the same time, con-
forming amendments changing substantive law may be made to titles other
than the principal title being amended so long as they relate to the same
subject. On the other hand, certain titles (e.g. Titles 1 (General Provisions),
69 (Saving and Validating Provisions) and 79 (Supplementary Provi-
sions) ) are broad in scope and may not sufficiently identify the subject to
permit comprehensive amendments to the particular title. In such cases,
amendments will be limited to a particular part of the title and may or may
not be accompanied by a corresponding amendment to a title containing the
principal subject of the amendment.
(c) General rule. Except as provided in subsection (d) of this sec-




Article III, section 3 of the Pennsylvania constitution has pro-
tected the general assembly and citizens of the Commonwealth
against legislative abuses for well over a century. To preserve its
beneficial effect, this provision should be modified only with great
caution, such as that demonstrated by the 1967 amendment. The
general assembly and the voters had two purposes in this amend-
ment: (1) to retain to the greatest extent possible the protection
against legislative abuse afforded by article III, section 3; and (2)
to permit codification of Pennsylvania's general and permanent stat-
ute law. Although the creation of an exception in favor of codifica-
tion bills was unnecessary, the amendment does delineate the consti-
tutional restrictions on the general assembly's power to codify.
For the reasons above, the scope of the exception must be lim-
ited to bills that codify or compile statutory law. A literal reading
of the exception to article III, section 3 demonstrates that its sole
office is to free multisubject bills that make no changes in substan-
tive law from the single subject and title notice requirements.1' The
practical dangers and constitutional infirmities of revision-plus-codi-
fication bills, on the other hand, militate against an expansive inter-
pretation of the exception. In construing a similar constitutional
provision the Alabama Supreme Court adopted an equally cautious
view:
All these considerations strongly argue that the exception of
'bills adopting a Code' from the safeguards so carefully framed
for the passage of laws should not be extended so as to afford a
ready means of evasion of their salutory provisions.
Our conclusion is that a bill adopting a Code, within the
exception to section 45, is one whose title . . . follows the lan-
guage of the exception, at least in substance, and which deals
with a compilation or body of laws theretofore prepared, and not
first set out and enacted in the bill itself.' 55
more than one subject.
(d) Revision of substantive law. The particular provisions of a bill
which revise the substantive law must be limited to one subject.
154. The Zeiter article is consistent with this interpretation:
[T]he amendment's sole office is to permit the enactment of one bill, the
multi-subject . . . act . . . (No. 230) [footnote 8] [a]nd, of course, any
other multi-subject bills independent of Act No. 230 which make no change
in existing law, i.e. which are true codifications or compilations.
Zeiter, supra note 1, at 548 & n.8 (emphasis in original).
155. Gibson v. State, 214 Ala. 38, 43, 106 So. 231, 235 (1925) (emphasis
added); see note 66 supra.
The codification process in Pennsylvania is now likely to go for-
ward of its own momentum. Its value to the Commonwealth can
be greatly enhanced, however, if it is based on sound constitutional
interpretation and practical drafting principles.
CHARLES W. RUBENDALL H
